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STATE RAILWAYS HAVE NO EXCLUSIVE OR INVIOLABLE FRANCHISES
THE POWERS AND
IN REGARD TO TRAFFIC IN OTHER STATES.
DUTIES OF CONGRESS IN REGARD TO THE REGULATION OF INTERHOW FAR IT MAY BE COMSTATE COMMERCE UPON RAILWAYS.
PETENT OR DESIRABLE FOR CONGRESS TO REGULATE FARES AND
FREIGHT UPON SUCH RAILWAYS.

THE MOST HOPEFUL MODE OF

EFFECTING THE SAME. BRIEF SUGGESTIONS IN REGARD TO SOME
SECRET SOCIETIES AND ITINEOF THE PROPOSED EXPEDIENTS.
RANT CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES. HOW THE COMPANIES WILL
ATTEMPT TO POSTPONE DEFINITE ACTION. THE IMPRACTICABILITY OF ENACTING A CODE UPON THE SUBJECT.

WE have been laboring, in our humble way, ever since we have
made the study of Railway Law a specialty, which is now a long
time, almost the period of the life of a generation, to make

business men, in this country, comprehend, that we could never
have a successful railway system, until it was brought effectually
under the control of Congress. And although there has been
great advance in that direction in the last twenty years, we cannot
fairly claim, that it has been, in any appreciable degree, the result
of any special efforts of our own, or of any other writer, or

,speaker, upon the legal questibns involved in the change.

It

seems to have been assumed, all along, that however desirable it

might be in the abstract, that the interstate railways of the
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country should be brought under the direction and control of Congress, the thing was, in point of law, altogether impracticable. This
view has been reached by a sort of jump conclusion, not uncommon, in
such matters, with large bodies of men, based, in this instance, largely
upon the facts, that all the railways in the country had been chartered
by the states, and had been, thus far, altogether under the control
of the states, so far as they were under any legal control external to the companies. This was, certainly, a not unnatural
conclusion to be made by merely practical and unprofessional persons. But when the question comes to be fairly examined, from
a legal point of view, with reference to our complex system of
government, it will at once appear that the states have no power
to charter, or to build and control highways, except within their
own limits, and for the purpose of doing business within the state.
The moment any highway, whether for ordinary travel, or for railway transportation, is carried across the line of the state, it ceases,
even as an incorporation, to owe any allegiance to the state where
it originated. State legislatures can only create corporations
within the particular state where chartered, and can confer no exclusive rights, or franchises, with reference to any action beyond
the limits of the state where created. These corporations may
indeed transact business in other states, under the laws of such
states, if so permitted by such other states; but they cannot, so
to speak, in any sense, emigrate to other states, or carry any of
their exclusive or special corporate franchises into such states.
This was fully settled in the leading case of The Bank of Augusta
v. Earle, 13 Pet. U. S. 519, 588; where TANEY, 0. J., thus defines the doctrine: "It [the corporation] exists only in contemplation of law, and by force of law; and where the law ceases to
operate, and is no longer obligatory, the corporation can have no
existence. It must dwell in the place of its creation, and cannot
migrate to another sovereignty." And much the same language
is used by THoMPsoN, J., in ?unyon v. Lessee of Coster, 14 Pet. U.
S.122, 131; and this has become the universally accepted doctrine
of the American courts. But this, as before said, will not preclude such corporations from transacting business in other states
and countries, and being there sued in relation to such transactions: Newby v. Colt's Patent Firearms Co., L. R. 7 Q. B. 293,
and cases above cited. But all this must be done under and by force
of the laws of such foreign state or country. And any exclusive
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privileges, or franchises, which such corporation may have obtained
by legislative incorporation or grant, in its own state, and which
cannot be there infringed, without violating the provision of the
national Constitution against the validity of state laws impairing
the obligation of contracts, will be of no avail in any other state,
or as against any other legislative body, except the one granting
such privileges and franchises. Thus it will occur, that if state
laws, incorporating railways as common carriers, without reserving
the power to regulate their tolls, fares and freights, would put
it beyond the power of such state legislature to pass laws regulating such tolls, fares and freights, within the state, which we by
no means admit, such acts of incorporation would be of no force
for rendering inviolable the rate of fares or freights fixed by the
company, and earned by such companies beyond the limits of the
state, or as against an Act of Congress regulating fares and freights
for transportation across the lines of two or more states, which latter
point we shall consider more at length hereafter.
The power of Congress, in regard to interstate commerce, i. e.
commerce between different states, whether two or more, is most
unlimited, by the very terms of the national Constitution. It extends as far as any national sovereignty extends, in regard to the
regulation of fares and freights upon existing railways. Congress
has the same power to regulate commerce among the states,
whether upon land or water, and to the same extent, that any
national legislature has to regulate it upon its railways, or its vessels
and ships of any kind. This will become very apparent by the
consideration, that this power resided, to its full extent, exclusively
in the states, before the adoption of the national Constitution, and
that it was transferred entire to the national government, by enumerating among the exclusive powers delegated to the national
government, "the power to regulate commerce with foreign nations
and among the several states." Nothing could be more sweeping
or exclusive in its terms. And all the decisions of the national
court of last resort have held the power of Congress "to regulate
commerce among the several states," to be exclusive of all power
in the states upon the subject. The very first case arising under
this provision, Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheaton 1, so declares the
power. Mr. Justice JOHNSON, in delivering his opinion in that
in speaking of the effect of the provision in the national Concasew,
stitution, upon the subject, as affecting existing state laws, said:
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"All the laws bearing upon commerce dropped lifeless from the
statute-book." And the leading opinion of Mr. Chief Justice
MARSHALL, in the same case, confirms this view, although the
exact point of the decision did not require the court to go that
length, since Congress had legislated upon the question involved
in that case. And the opinion here declared, of the exclusiveness
of the power of Congress to regulate commerce among the states,
and the invalidity of all state laws enacted for that purpose, is
fully confirmed in most of the subsequent cases, upon the point,
in that court: Passenger Cases, 7 How. U. S. 283; and with
slight qualification, not affecting the main question, Cooley v.
Port Wardens, 12 How. U. S. 299 ; Gilman v. Philadelpia, 3
Wall. 713; Crandallv. Nevada, 6 Wall. 35. The only qualificdtion which has ever been attempted to be placed upon the exclusiveness of the power in Congress to regulate commerce, even
before any express provision made by them upon the point in
question, is that of the right of the states to build bridges across
navigable rivers, and other acts pertaining to the regulation of
their own internal government and police, and which did not conflict with any positive provision of an Act of Congress, although
it might possibly affect commerce, both foreign and interstate, in
a remote and incidental manner.
This view is maintained by GRIER, Justice, in 7%e Passaic
Bridges, 3 Wall. 782, where the learned judge said: "The police
power to make bridges over the public rivers is as absolutely and
exclusively vested in a state, as the commercial power is in Congress." And the same course of reasoning will apply to state
laws, enacted for the purpose of carrying into effect those functions
of internal government, which, upon every principle, belong exclusively to the states, such for instance, as pilotage, ferries, health
regulations, the support of paupers, the public police, and the
punishment of crime-although such state enactments may, incidentally, affect some departments of commerce beyond the limits
of the state, and which is therefore under the exclusive regulation
and control of Congress. Thus a state law prohibiting the
floating of loose logs on the Susquehanna river, was held valid:
Craig v. Cline, 65 Penn. St. 399. And to improve the navigation of an interstate navigable river was held valid: M-eleynolds v. Smallhouse, 8 Bush 447. But no state law purposely
designed for, and adapted to the regulation of interstate or foreign
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commerce, as a system, could be upheld, whether Congress bad
legislated upon the particular subject or question, or not. Phis
is abundantly maintained in the opinion of Mr..Justice STRONG
in the very latest decision of the Supreme Court upon the question : Case of the State Freight Tax, 15 Wall. 232 and cases there
cited. SWAYNE, Justice, in Gilman v. Philadelphia,3 Wall. 713,
thus defines the exclusive jurisdiction of Congress over subjects
committed to its care in the national Constitution. "The states
may exercise concurrent power in all cases but three: 1st. Where
the power is lodged exclusively in the Federal Constitution. 2d.
Where it is given to the United States and prohibited to the states.
3d. Where from the nature and subjects of the power it must
necessarily be exercised by the Federal government exclusively."
And Mr. Justice STRONG, in the case of the State Freight Tax,
supra, thus clearly defines the necessity of holding to the exclusive jurisdiction of Congress over the subject now under consideration. "The rule has been asserted with great clearness, that whenever the subjects, over which a power to regulate commerce is asserted, are in their nature national, or admit of one uniform system
or plan of regulation, they may justly be said to be of such a nature
as to require exclusive -legislation of Congress;" citing Cooley
v. Port Wardens, 12 How. U. S. 299; Gilman v. Piladelphia,
supra; Crandall v. The State of .Nevada, 6 Wall. 35, and then
concludes: "Surely transportation of passengers or merchandise
through a stite, or from one state to another, is of this nature.
It is of national importance that over that subject there should
be but one regulating power." This being the final declaration
of the court of last resort, we need occupy no more time in showing that the entire question of the regulation and control of railway fares and freight upon lines of railway, extending across the
line of two or more coterminous states, belongs exclusively to
Congress; for this very iquestion was directly involved, and
squarely decided, in the case from which we have just quoted the
language of the opinion of the court. If then there is any control, or power of regulation, over the traffic upon through lines of
railway, it must be sought for exclusively in Congress. Unless
we are prepared to say, that one of the most unlimited and overwhelming monopolies it is possible to conceive of, after it is once
set in operation, may safely be ommitted to the impulses of its
own selfish instincts and interests, without any supervision or
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control whatever, we may demand the interposition of Congress in
thig matter.
We may then inquire how extensive the subjects are which are
thus brought under the control of congressional legislation. The
extent of the particulars embraced under the general term "corn•merce," as carried on with foreign nations, and among the several
states, is defined in much the same sense, in all the cases decided
by the national courts, since the adoption of the national constitution. It is thus expressed by a very eminent judge, Mr. Justice
WASHINGTON, in the early case of Corfield v. Coryell, 4 Wash. C.
C. 379 : "C ommerce with foreign nations, and among the several
states, can mean nothing more than intercourse with those nations,
and among these states, for the purposes of trade * * and this
intercourse must include all the means by which it can be carried
on, whether by the free navigation of the waters of the several
states, or by a passage over land through the states, where such
passage becomes necessary to the commercial intercourse between
the states." And M'r. Chief Justice MARSHALL, in Gibbons v.
Ogden, 9 Wheaton 1, uses much the same language: "Commerce,
undoubtedly, is traffic, but it is something more, it is intercourse.
It describes the commercial intercourse between nations and parts
of nations, in all its branches; and is regulated by prescribing
rules for carrying on that intercourse." This seems to cover the
whole question we are discussing, and it is repeated -ina very large
number of cases, covering the entire period of our national existence. Mr. Justice JOHNSON, in the case last cited, uses language
still more explicit: " Commerce, in its simplest signification, means
an exchange of goods; but in the advancement of society, labor,
transportation, intelligence, care, and various mediums of exchange,
become commodities, and enter into commerce; the subject, the
vehicle, the agent, and their various operations, become the objects
of commercial regulation. Shipbuilding, the carrying trade, and
propagation of seamen, are such vital agents of commercial prosperity, that the nation which could not legislate over these subjects
would not possess power to regulate commerce." Within all this
,vide range Congress possesses sovereign and unlimited powers.
It may prescribe what trade shall be allowed, and what not. It
might, unquestionably, during the existence of slavery, if it had
possessed the independence, have declared the interstate slave trade
illegal, and thus have materially hastened the ab6lition of slavery.
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Or it might now prohibit the importation of foreign spirits, or
wines even, or the trade in such commodities among the several
states. It may legislate, as it often has done, for the greater
security of life, or property, on board American vessels, or steamboats, engaged in foreign or interstate navigation, or it may modify
or relax the stringency of the responsibility of common carriers,
as in the Act of Congress of 1851, limiting the responsibility of
ship owners or masters for goods on board, injured by fire, without
design or negligence, which has been held to extend to the baggage of passengers: Chamberlain v. Western TransportationCo.,
44 N. Y. 805.
And Congress must possess the same power to regulate traffic
upon railways, extending into different states, which it does in
regard to that which is carried on upon the ocean, or the navigable
interstate rivers. It may prescribe what trade is permissible and
what contraband, or illegal, both in times of peace and war. It
may also define the precautions and appliances which shall be had,
in order to secure life and property, in such transportation of
passengers and goods as shall be carried across the line of different
states. And this supervision, or right of supervision by Congress,
will extend to all the appliances of transportation, to the men and
to the machinery. It may require every passenger train to be
fully equipped with the Miller-platform upon every carriage in the
train, and with the air-brakes, to such an extent as to insure the
speediest arrest of the train, in case of impending peril. It may
prescribe the number of hands on each train, and the precautions
to be resorted to, in order to prevent the misplacement of switches,
or the collision of trains, whether with trains in the opposite or
in the same direction. In short, there is nothing, affecting the conduct of the entire business of through trains upon railways, which
the enactments of Congress cannot reach.
But the most interesting question, just.now, affecting the regulation of this traffic by Congress, is how far and in what mode the
legislation of Congress may control and define the rate of charge,
upon interstate railways, whether by way of tolls, or of fare and
freight. We need not here discuss the difference between the two
modes of collecting these due--whether by tolls, or by fare and
freight. Fare and freight , - now the chief modes in exercise by
railway companies, and are those most familiar to all readers. Fare
and freight then, upon all interstate railway traffic, are wholly
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under the control of Congress, to-the same extent they are in England, under the Acts of Parliament, or in any other sovereignty,
under the governing power, whether legislative or executive. Andl
this congressional regulation and control attaches to interstate
traffic, not only where it has actually been carried across the dividing line of two states, but from themoment it is taken in charge
by the carrier, as, ti'affic, whether in goods or persons, and which
is destined to cross state lines in its transit: The Daniel Ball,
10 Wall. 557.
We are not. aware that any fair question can be raised in regard
to the right of Congress to control the fares and freights upon interstate railways. No such question has ever been raised in England
in regard to the power of Parliament, and we do not comprehend how
one could be raised in any country, unless there were some constitutional, restriction upon the sovereign power. In the absence of
all such restriction the supreme power might impose conditions
upon existing companies which would annihilate their business at
once. But of course we name this only to show the unlimited
nature of the power, and not because we suppose it would ever be
resorted to; this is admitted by all in regard to the legislative
power of the British Parliament, and we have never been able to
find any one, who could assign any sensible reason why the legislative power of the American legislatures, both state and national,
in the absence of constitutional restrictions, should be less than
that of the British Parliament: Thorpe v. .t.& B. Ry., 27 Vt.
142; 2 Redf. Am. Ry. Cases 587.
But there have been some decisions and some discussion upon the
question of regulating fares and freights upon existing railways, by
the state legislatures where they exist, which may possibly puzzle
some, who have given the subject no special study. It is conceded,
we believe, upon all hands, at the present time, that all railways,
which become common carriers, are bound by the rules of the common law, and one might almost say, by the very law of their
being, which the term "1common carrier" sufficiently evinces, to
carry for all who apply, for reasonable compensation, and to make
no unreasonable or unjust discrimination among those who desire
to employ them: Barris v. Packwood, 8 Taunt. 264; Titchburg
By. v. Gage, 12 Gray 393; Ch. & Alton Railroadv. The People;
5 Chicago Legal News 266; Bennett v. Dutton, 10 N. H. 481;
Jencks v. Coleman, 2 Sumner 221, 224; Gaston v. Bristol &
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Exeter By., 1 B. & S. 112; -Express Co. v. .Maine Central By., 9
Am. Law. Reg. N. S. 728; tcDuffie v. Portland & Bochester
By., 52 N. H. 430. The last two cases hold that railway companies cannot give greater privileges and facilities uipon their trains
to one express company than to others.
But it has sometimes been held in the state courts, that railway
companies having obtained legislative power by charter to become
common carriers, and to charge toll, or fares and freight, to those
who employ them, no right to alter or amend their charters being
reserved therein, have thus acquired an indefeasible vested right
to fix their own rates of charge, in their own discretion, independent of all legislative control, under that provision in the national
Constitution, prohibiting the states from passing any law impairing
the obligation of contracts: Philadelphia&. Baltimore Bailroad
v. Bowers, Delaware Ct. of Appeals, Jan. T. 1873. And the
newspapers report a decision of the Supreme Court of Minnesota,
in the opposite direction. We need not discuss this question, upon
its merits, here, having said all we desire to say in Tho;pe v. Beet.
& B. By., supra. But it is important here to show, that no such
question can possibly arise in regard to railways chartered by
Congress, for the purpose of carrying on interstate commerce, or
as to state railways which are carrying on the same commerce, by
means of voluntary junctions on state lines, under the enabling Act
of Congress for that purpose, "entitled an act to facilitate commercial, postal and military communication among the several states,"
passed June 15th 1866; inasmuch as the restriction upon the states
in regard to laws impairing the obligation of contracts does not embrace Congress or apply to any law of the national legislature, but
only to state laws: Evans v. Eaton, Pet. C. C. 322. As to the
railways chartered by the states, if we admit the state legislatures
have no power to control their rates of charge or modes of doing
business, which we by no means admit, as doubtful even, yet if it
were true"to the full extent claimed by the Delaware Court of Appeals, it could not affect state railways after they engage in interstate traffic: 1st. Because they have no charter franchise for any
such business, nor can they obtain any such franchise from any
other source except Congress-and if they enter upon such service
they must do it subject to the unlimited supervision and control
of Congress, secured to it by the express provisions of the national
constitution. 2d. Whatever exclusive franchises state railways
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may have secured by state legislative grants, must have been accepted by the companies, under the express knowledge and consent
that such franchises were to be, and must for ever remain, subject to
the lawful control of Congress in the regulation of interstate commerce. So that, in no view, have the state railways any the
slightest ground of claim, that in attempting to carry on interstate
commerce, a business to which their charter powers could not, by
state laws, be extended, they ean demand the s~me exemption
from Congressional control, which some: of the states (upon very
unsatisfactory grounds as it seems to us) have extended to them
as to state legislation.
Having shown in this brief manner, the exclusive power of
Congress, in the regulation and control of all the departments rand
appliances of commerce among the several states, and how very
extensive and unquestionable this power is, it only remains to say
a few words in regard to the duty of Congress in the matter, and
the most hopeful mode of reaching the desired end. And here we
feel the difficulty of saying anything, which is likely to be of much
service. The object is one, no doubt, of most unquestionable magnitude, scarcely less than that which existed under the old confederation, when every .state was 'struggling to enact commercial
regulations of such a character as to bring the most advantage to
itself, and at the expense of any or all the others. If this was
then felt to be intolerable in a commercial country, not less so is
the present complication, where all business, and almost existence
itself, is at the mercy of railway transportation. It has become so
indispensable to the very existence of the country, and such an overwhelming monopoly, that the very life of all the internal trade and
commerce of the country is already at its mercy and must for ever
remain so, unless Congress shall interpose some effective remedy.
The states have, as we have seen, no power to act in the matter of
interstate communication, and this is the principal seat of the
difficulty, and if the states had now the same power they had
under the ot confederation, it needs no argument to show, that
forty independent legislatures could never agree upon any effective
system of interstate commercial intercourse, or even if they could
agree upon such a plan, which is scarcely less than impossible,
they have no combined judicial machinery to carry it into effect.
There could be no hope of relief from any imaginable source but
in the national prerogatives.
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And we believe the most rampant advocate of free trade, and
the "let alone" policy, would not quite feel prepared to argue,
that the true remedy,. in this case, lay in the line of his favorite
theory. The result is entirely certain, that if the railways are
allowed to pursue the unrestrained course now entered upon by
them, the expenses of transportation will ultimately absorb all the
'rofits of interstate trade and manufactures. Foreign transportadon, and that upon the coast, or the navigable rivers, among the
states, requires no such stringent rules of limitation ; competition
is so free and unrestrained there, as to correct any evil tendency in
this direction. But railways are absolutely beyond all healthy competition. The only competition centres in a few important points,
to which fares and freights become merely nominal, and the profits
thus lost to the railways are assessed upon way transportation
where there is no competition; thus creating a double injustice,
which requires the constant supervision of stringent enactments,
vigorously and vigilantly enforced by an energetic and impartial
judicial administration. The. language of an able writer in 85
Westminster Review 310, is both pertinent and just, in regard to
this point: "Now applying these pervading rules of our policy to
the particular question before us, it is manifest, that all talk of free
competition in the matter of railways is so much loose and inaccurate
verbiage, or rather irrational cant. * * From the nature of the
case no traffic but their own can compete with them on their roads.
The distinct character and-excellence of their mode of conveyance
has diverted all the chief traffic from the ancient highways, and
it is only through occasional competition with each other, that
they find for a time, any natural and spontaneous check upon
their exactions. It is obvious, that the concession of what is practically an exclusive right of carriage throughout the entire kingdom . * never could have been granted simply for the advantage
of the companies themselves." The writer concludes that if the
exorbitant exactions of the English railways, for the transportation of the indispensable necessities of life, such as coal, continue, the outcries of the public are justified until Parliament interposes an effective remedy by way of a "reformed tariff," which
shall only secure to the companies a reasonable return for the
money actually invested. The attempt of some able writers in
this country, to argue, that the American expedient of issuing
shares from time to time, based upon no actual increase of capital
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expended, has ,othing to do with the overcharges of such roads,
must be regardhed as a practical illusion, since this process of what
i. calh-d " waterinig the stock," is resorted to as a blind to cover
the exorbitance of their demands for transportation. It is the
shn plea of the brigand, in justification of his exactions, for the
.ujport qf his wfe and children, who have no existence, save in
his filse netences : it is the tattered dress of the mendicant, ass tined to justify his importunities.
That soine remedy is imperiously demanded for such a fatal
malaly all must, we think, admit. That many of those hitherto
attempted will prove more disastrous than even the disease itself,
need not be argued, to sober and thoughtful persons, who have
much knowledge of the nature of the evil. The favorite remedy
for all evils and for all discomforts in our day, secret societies, in
the nature of conspiracies and counter conspiracies, which in the
good ol days of the rugged enforcement of the sturdy morality
of the English common law, would have been abated by indictment, as nuisances, too offensive to be endured by a free people,
will be found only suited to a state of society and government,
where might overrides right, and where despotism, in one form
or another, either has, or is destined to crush out every liberal
sentiment, both of law and morality. Whenever the time comes,
that government must be approached, or moved to action, by secret
combinations, by devices, evasions and subterfuges, the substance
of free and constitutional government will have ceased, however
much longer its forms and ceremonial may abide with us. If we
cannot reform this evil, through independent legislation in the
rightful quarter, and pure judicial administration, we shall attempt
it in vain by other inventions.
And it does not seem to us very hopeful of any settled determination on the part of Congress to afford speedy redress in this
matter, that we have a congressional committee, parading the country, under the pretence of collecting information relative to these
questions. Whenever an individual, or a community, becomes in
earnest upon any question, these preparatory evolutions cease,
and action begins, at once. This committee upon transportation
looks more like a blind, than an earnest movement, in the direction
of effective action.
What we most need is a few earnest men, of the right stamp,
either in or out of Congress, to push the matter to an issue. We
have no doubt that facts exist, if properly collected and presented,
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to set the whole country in a blaze. We know of many cases in
New England, where charges for transportation are made, by some
device, to double the advertised rates, and thus render the products
valueless to the consumer, as well as the producer: These rates
are sometimes fourfold the charges for transportation of the same
commodities ten, or even twenty times as far in the same direction,
and over the ,same lines, and the undercharge in one instance
covers the overcharge in the other, often. What we need is a
national tariff of interstate freights, that shall cure both these
excesses in opposite directions, and of the legality of such a tariff
no good lawyer can entertain any doubt.
We do not feel it to be our province to enter into detail in regard
to the particular remedy required in this case. We are satisfied
it will come more naturally, and more effectively, by successive
enactments of Congress, applied to existing evils, and to those hereafter occurring, as they develop. The roads, we presume, will
ask for a code upon the subject, to be prepared by a commission,
a favorite evasion in our day, which will naturally contain so many
weak points that it will never be enacted by Congress, and thus a
long delay will be secured, just what the opposers of action desire.
The first enactment of Congress should contain a declaration,
that the act shall extend only to such transportation as passes,
or is intended to pass, the line of two or more states. It should
also give the national courts jurisdiction in all cases arising under
the act, and provide the form of redress, to some extent. It should
make the subject of commerce among the states, either a distinct
department of the national government, or subject to the control
of a board of commissioners, paid for their whole time, which shall
be devoted to the enforcement of the law. The law should require
uniform rates, for the same service, and no discrimination. There
is much more we desire to say, but we forbear.
I. F. R.
We have omitted to discuss one very important practical view of this subject,
but which will readily occur to all. The existence of a judicious tariff of fire4
and freights, upon all through lines, which must prevent all destructive competition, at the more important points, which now exists to such an extent as to compel the companies to carry a considerable part of their through freight for merely
nominal pay, cannot fail to be of the greatest benefit to them as well as to the
public. And if the companies maintain a factious opposition to such a tariff
which will compel them to charge a remunerative compensation upon all their
traffic, it must proceed from one of two causes ; either that they do not well comprebend the effect of such a tariff, or else that they do not intend to limit their
demands to a merely living compensation for their services, which is all they can
fairly expect, in any capacity of public service, which theirs undoubtedly is.

